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Abstract
Substantial empirical research has shown that the level of individualism vs. collectivism is one of the most
critical and important determinants of societal traits, such as economic growth, economic institutions and health
conditions. But the exact nature of this impact has thus far not been well understood in an analytical setting. In this
work, we develop one of the first theoretical models that analytically studies the impact of individualism-collectivism
on the society. We model the growth of an individual’s welfare (wealth, resources and health) as depending not
only on himself, but also on the level of collectivism, i.e. the level of dependence on the rest of the individuals
in the society, which leads to a co-evolutionary setting. Based on our model, we are able to predict the impact of
individualism-collectivism on various societal metrics, such as average welfare, average life-time, total population,
cumulative welfare and average inequality. We analytically show that individualism has a positive impact on average
welfare and cumulative welfare, but comes with the drawbacks of lower average life-time, lower total population and
higher average inequality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Why are some societies wealthier or healthier than others? Why do some societies have substantial inequality
among their members while others have relatively little? And why do certain societies have a large population while
others have a small population? Culture, specifically the level of individualism vs. collectivism in the society, plays
an important and even central role in answering the above questions [1] [2].
Landes [3] [4] and many others make the argument for the impact of culture on economic development.
Furthermore, in [5] the authors argue that among the different dimensions of culture that affect long run growth, such
as individualism-collectivism, masculinity, power distance etc., the single most relevant dimension is individualism-
collectivism. Thus understanding the impact of the level of individualism vs. collectivism on a society is of incredible
importance in building a model of societal development. In individualistic societies, people tend to depend more
on themselves and less on society for growth in life, whereas in collectivistic societies, people tend to contribute
to and depend on society to a greater extent. The level of collectivism in the society thus determines how much
the growth of an individual is affected by the society, as well as how much the individual affects the development
of the society, leading to a co-evolutionary setting. In this paper, collectivism represents a cultural element and not
communism or a state (or religion) direction of activity.
There has been substantial research [2] [6] [7] [8] towards analyzing the determinants of societal development.
A significant thrust of this research has been on developing theories based on empirical tests [2] [7] [9]. Empirical
studies have established the positive impact of individualism on economic parameters, namely GDP per capita and
GDP of a country [8]. But there is also more inequality in the societies with higher levels of development both in
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economic [10] [11] and health conditions [12]. Even though these empirical results exist, developing mathematical
models to understand such social systems is very important, because these mathematical models help us predict
societal phenomenon and provide useful insights which can otherwise not be obtained just based on empirical tests.
However, there are relatively few papers that analytically study the impact of individualism vs. collectivism. In [6]
the author develops a mathematical model to show that individualism-collectivism is important in determining the
structure of economic institutions in the society. In [8] the authors come up with a mathematical model through
which they can predict that the individualistic societies promote more long run economic growth than collectivistic
societies.
In this work, we develop a mathematical model of the impact of individualism-collectivism on more general
parameters of a society, as opposed to only on economic institutions as in the above papers. Our mathematical
model helps us answer questions pertaining to the impact of individualism-collectivism on the socio-economic
inequality in the society, the total population that can be sustained in the society and the average life-time of
individuals, which cannot be answered with existing models. In our model, individuals are born into the society
with a fixed level of intrinsic quality, which determines the rate of change of their welfare. Welfare in our model
is an abstract quantity which represents an aggregate of the wealth, resources and health of an individual. An
individual in our model will die either if its level of welfare drops too low or due to natural causes. Importantly,
the level of collectivism determines the extent to which an individual’s welfare is affected by rest of the society
and vice-versa. Our objective is to compare societies with different levels of collectivism, levels of welfare required
to survive while assuming the societies are identically impacted by other factors, such as economic institutions,
government [13] [14] or geography, environment [15]. Our model is simplistic as we abstract away the impact of
economic institutions, government, geography and environment however, it still allows us to capture the impact
of individualism-collectivism, as well as other forces, such as the level of welfare required to survive on societal
metrics, namely average welfare, average life-time, average inequality, and total population. From our model we
can make the following predictions:
1. Although there is higher societal support given to individuals with low quality in a collectivistic society, this
does not increase the average welfare of individuals in collectivistic societies since the support from the rest of
individuals in society comes at the expense of their own welfare levels. This implies lower average welfare levels
in a collectivistic society than in an individualistic society.
2. Despite lower average welfare levels, average life-time may be higher in a collectivistic society because the
social support given to lower quality individuals will allow them to survive for a longer amount of time. This also
means that collectivistic societies can sustain higher population levels.
3. Cumulative welfare, defined as the total wealth, resources and health of a society, is lower in a collectivistic
society. Although a collectivistic society supports a larger total population than an individualistic society, this
increase is dominated by the decrease in the average welfare.
4. The level of inequality in the society is higher in an individualistic society than in a collectivistic one, because
individualistic societies allow agents to reach higher personal welfare while giving less social support to individuals
with low welfare levels.
5. In addition we also study the impact of rate of birth, rate of natural deaths and the minimum welfare level
required to survive on the above societal metrics.
Our analytical results are in general agreement with the existing empirical evidence, and we also provide some
new predictions that have so far not been tested empirically. We want to emphasize that the study here is very
general and potentially has a broader scope. Individualism-collectivism is a trait not particular to humans, and in a
broad sense it can capture the collectivistic versus individualistic behavior of different biological species, such as
bacteria [16]. Being able to mathematically understand individualism and collectivism is not only useful for societal
evolution, but can also be of significant interest in biology.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an infinite horizon continuous-time model with a continuum of individuals living in a society. Each
individual is characterized by his intrinsic quality, Q, which models his ability to develop in life, i.e. increase his
wealth, resources and health. The intrinsic quality is a random variable which can take either a good or a bad value,
i.e. Q ∈ {1,−1}, where the probability that Q = 1, P (Q = 1) = 12 . Due to space limitations, we only treat a
simplistic model here, however our results can be extended for more general distributions of quality. We denote the
individual’s welfare, an abstract quantity representing aggregate wealth, resources and health of individual, at time
t from birth as, X(t) and the welfare at birth is zero, X(0) = 0. The rate at which the welfare of an individual
increases at any time t from birth is determined by the individual’s quality as well as the average quality of the
rest of society, and is given by R(t) , dX(t)dt = (1−w).Q+w.Q¯(t), where Q¯(t) is the average quality of all the
individuals in the society at time t, and w ∈ [0, 1] is the level of dependence on society. This weight w is same for
all individuals in the society and is a measure of collectivism in the society, i.e. w = 1 and w = 0 correspond to a
purely collectivistic and purely individualistic society respectively. This mutual dependence amongst the individuals
leads to a co-evolutionary setting.
The individuals are born into the society at a rate of λb mass per unit time, which means that the total mass of
individuals entering the society in ∆t time is λb∆t. Individuals in the society can die either due to natural causes
or due to poor welfare levels. The death due to natural causes is modelled as a Poisson arrival process with a rate
λd starting at the time of birth of the individual, and at the first arrival instance the individual dies, see Fig. 1. The
death due to poor welfare levels happens if the welfare levels fall below a threshold, −r which we call the death
boundary, see Fig. 1.
Steady State of the Society: As time increases the population increases up to a point where the rate of death
equals the rate of birth. Thus the total population will converge to a fixed mass, and the distribution of welfare
levels within the society will also converge to a constant. Thus in a steady state: a) the total population mass in
the society attains a fixed value, denoted by Pop(λb, λd, r, w), at which the rate of birth will equal the rate of
death and b) the density of the population at a given welfare level x, pλd,λd,r,w(x), see Fig. 2, and the mass of the
population with quality Q = q, M(q), are also determined. We show below in Theorem 1 that there is always a
unique steady state in our model given the exogenous parameters {λb, λd, r, w}, which characterize the society.
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Figure 1. Life-time of good and bad quality individuals.
Theorem 1. Every society has a unique steady state.
The detailed proofs can be found in the appendix (Section V) given at the end.
Lemma 1. Good and bad quality individuals attain positive and negative welfare values respectively in the steady
state.
Bad quality individuals can die either due to a Poisson arrival or due to poor welfare levels. As a result the
proportion of the bad quality individuals is lower than that of good quality ones, which leads to a positive average
quality Q¯(λb, λd, r, w). Hence, good quality individuals cannot take negative welfare values. Also, it can be shown
that the bad quality individuals cannot take positive welfare values, see the appendix (Section V) at the end for
details.
In the unique steady state the population density, pλd,λd,r,w(x) decays exponentially in both positive and negative
directions, see Fig. 2. We illustrate the life-time of an individual with good (bad) quality, i.e. Q = 1 (Q = −1)
in steady state in Fig. 1. The positive (negative) welfare levels are attained by good (bad) quality individuals in
the population. The rate at which the welfare of a bad quality individual decays in time is typically lesser than
the rate of growth of good quality individuals, (due to the opposing effects of the negative quality and positive
societal support for a bad quality individual), this leads to a higher decay in the population density of bad quality
individuals as compared to good quality individuals, see Fig. 2. We focus on understanding the impact of the
exogenous parameters on the properties of this steady state. To do so we denominate some important societal
metrics which help understand the properties of the steady state.
Definition 1. Average quality: The average quality of individuals represents the net impact the society has on
rate of growth of welfare of each individual and is defined as Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) = 1
M(Q=1)
Pop(λb,λd,r,w)
− 1. M(Q=−1)Pop(λb,λd,r,w) .
Definition 2. Average welfare: The average value of welfare of the population, a measure of the average wealth,
resources and health of an individual in the society, is defined as X¯(λb, λd, r, w) =
´∞
−r x
pλb,λd,r,w(x)
Pop(λb,λd,r,w)
dx.
Let T denote the random variable corresponding to the life-time of an individual in steady state. Let R be the
rate of growth of the individual in steady state where R = (1 − w).Q + w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)) and Q is the quality
of the individual. If R ≥ 0, then the individual’s welfare will always be above zero, hence the individual will
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Figure 2. Steady State Distribution of population density as a function of welfare levels.
only die when there is a Poisson arrival. Therefore, T in this case will be an exponential random variable, T
′
,
with mean 1λd . If R < 0 then the death will happen either at time T2(λb, λd, r, w) =
r
1−w(1+Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)) , where
T2(λb, λd, r, w) is the time taken to reach the death boundary, or if there is a Poisson arrival before T2(λb, λd, r, w).
Hence, T = min{T ′ , T2(λb, λd, r, w)},
Definition 3. Average life-time: The average life-time of an individual is defined as the expected value of the
life-time (unconditional on individual’s quality), T¯ (λb, λd, r, w) =Eλb,λd,r,w[T ].
The next societal metric is a measure of average inequality in the welfare levels of individuals.
Definition 4. Average inequality: Average inequality, a measure of disparity in the society, is defined as the
variance of welfare , V arX(λb, λd, r, w) =
´∞
−r(x− X¯(λb, λd, r, w))2
pλb,λd,r,w(x)
Pop(λb,λd,r,w)
dx.
Next, we come up with a notion of Cumulative welfare, which is the aggregate amount of welfare in the society,
a measure of total wealth and resources.
Definition 5. Cumulative welfare: The cumulative welfare, a measure of total welfare of society accumulated
together, is defined as CF (λb, λd, r, w) = Pop(λb, λd, r, w)X¯(λb, λd, r, w).
In the above societal metrics, average life-time, total population and average quality are more intuitive to
understand, while average welfare is similar to GDP per capita [8], cumulative welfare is similar to the GDP
[8] and average inequality is related to GINI coefficient [10] [11].
III. RESULTS
In this section, we will compare different societal metrics across societies differing either in the level of
collectivism, w or the other exogenous parameters.
Lemma 2. a) The average quality Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) and the average welfare X¯(λb, λd, r, w) of an individual
decrease as the level of collectivism w increases. b) Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) and X¯(λb, λd, r, w) decrease as the rate of
natural deaths λd increases. c) Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) and X¯(λb, λd, r, w) decrease as the death boundary−r decreases.
In part a), as the level of collectivism is increased, the support from the society slows the rate at which the
welfare of a bad quality individual decays with time, causing a larger proportion of the population to be of low
quality. The good quality individuals contribute more to this support as well and as a result their own growth is
slowed. As a result, there is a negative impact both on the average quality and average welfare of the individuals.
Parts b) and c) are straightforward, see the appendix (Section V) at the end for detail. This lemma is supported
by the empirical studies showing lower per capita income in collectivistic societies in comparison to individualistic
societies [8].
Theorem 2. a) Total population Pop(λb, λd, r, w) increases as the rate of birth λb increases. b) Pop(λb, λd, r, w)
increases as the level of collectivism w increases. c) Pop(λb, λd, r, w) increases as the death boundary−r decreases.
d) If w < 12 then Pop(λb, λd, r, w) increases as the rate of natural deaths λd decreases.
Part a) and c) are easier to comprehend, see the appendix (Section V) at the end for details. For part b), as the
level of collectivism increases the support from the society slows the rate at which the welfare of a bad quality
individual decays with time. As a result, the proportion of individuals dying at the death boundary decreases, which
means that the population level at which the mass of population dying equals the mass of population being born
is higher. This agrees with the empirical studies which show collectivistic societies have less income per worker
and have a larger population [17] [18]. In part d), as the rate at which natural deaths occur decreases, the rate of
deaths due to achieving poor welfare levels through hitting the death boundary can increase. However, if the level
of dependence on the society is low then the decrease in the rate of natural deaths dominates, and as a result the
total population increases such that the mass of deaths equals mass of birth.
Theorem 3: a) Cumulative welfare CF (λb, λd, r, w) decreases as the rate of birth λb decreases. b) CF (λb, λd, r, w)
decreases as the rate of natural deaths λd increases. c) If λdr ≤  < 12 and w < 12 −  with  > 0, then
CF (λb, λd, r, w) decreases as the death boundary −r decreases. d) CF (λb, λd, r, w) decreases as the level of
collectivism w increases.
Since CF (λb, λd, r, w) ∝ Pop(λb, λd, r, w), part a) follows from Theorem 2. For part b), as the rate of natural
death increases the average welfare of an individual decreases (Lemma 2) and the total population also decreases
(Theorem 2), if the level of collectivism is not high. This shows the result for part b), when the collectivism is not
high. However, it can be shown that even if the level of collectivism is high then as well there will be a decrease
in cumulative welfare owing to a significant decrease in the average welfare (see the appendix (Section V)). For
part c), as the death boundary decreases, the total population in the society increases whereas the average welfare
of an individual decreases, leading to opposing effects. Therefore, if the λdr is sufficiently low then the proportion
of the population with bad quality is sufficiently low as well. Also, if the level of collectivism, w is low then then
the rate at which the welfare of bad quality individuals decays with time is high, hence the effect of decreasing the
death boundary on the average welfare is high. Under these conditions the decrease in average welfare dominates
the increase in population. For part d), increasing the level of collectivism increases the total population (Theorem
2), but it decreases the average welfare of an individual (Lemma 2). Interestingly, it can be shown that the decrease
in the average welfare of an individual dominates the increase in population (see the appendix (Section V) for
technical detail). This result is also aligned with the empirical tests showing higher GDPs for an individualistic
society [8].
Theorem 4. a) Average life time T¯ (λb, λd, r, w) decreases with an increase in rate of natural deaths λd. b) If
λdr > θ
∗ = ln(1 +
√
2
2 ) then T¯ (λb, λd, r, w) increases with an increase in level of collectivism w else, it first
decreases and then increases with an increase in level of collectivism w. c), If λdr > θ∗, then T¯ (λb, λd, r, w)
increases with a decrease in death boundary −r else, it first decreases and then increases with a decrease in death
boundary −r.
For part a), an increase in the rate of deaths will affect the life-time of both good and bad quality individuals
negatively, thus leading to the result. For part b), increasing the level of collectivism slows the rate at which the
welfare of individuals with bad quality decays with time resulting in an increase in their life-time. It also leads to an
increase in the proportion of individuals with bad quality, but note that individuals with good quality have a higher
life-time than individuals with bad quality. This leads to an opposing effect. However, if λdr is high i.e. λdr > θ∗,
then the proportion of the individuals with bad quality is high enough, implying that the increase in the life-time
of individuals with bad quality has a dominating effect in comparison to the decrease resulting from a decreasing
proportion of individuals with good quality. The proportion of the population of bad quality individuals increases
with an increase in the level of collectivism. If λdr ≤ θ∗ and the level of collectivism is sufficiently high, there
will be a sufficiently high proportion of bad quality individuals, and so if level of collectivism is increased then
there will be an increase in the average life-time. However, if the level of collectivism is not high then there will
be a decrease in the average life-time with an increase in the level of collectivism. A similar explanation applies
to part c). In Fig. 3, it is shown that if λdr is sufficiently high the average life-time increases with the level of
collectivism, otherwise, the average life-time decreases and then increases. It is important at this point to note that
in part b), we compare two societies with different levels of collectivism while other parameters remain the same
which may include medical facilities, health awareness etc. that are also crucial determinants of life-time. Also, our
model does not yet consider the impact of cumulative welfare on the rate of natural deaths λd and is an important
direction for future research.
Theorem 5. The average inequality V arX(λb, λd, r, w) is always more in an individualistic society w = 0
as compared to a collectivistic society w = 1. Also if the person only dies a natural death, i.e. r → ∞, then a)
limr→∞ V arX(λb, λd, r, w) decreases with an increase in level of collectivism w and b) limr→∞ V arX(λb, λd, r, w)
decreases with an increase in rate of natural deaths λd.
For part a), the case when an individual only dies a natural death there is a symmetry in the proportion of
individuals with good and bad quality. Hence, the average quality of an individual is zero. Therefore, the rate of
decay (growth) for an individual with bad (good) quality is 1 − w. Hence, increasing w slows the rate of decay
and growth, thereby allowing individuals to neither take too low or too high welfare values, which leads to a
lower average inequality. Having higher levels of inequality in individualistic societies has also been observed
in calculations of GINI coefficient for various countries [10], [11]. Also, having higher inequality has been an
important factor affecting the health of the society [12], this observation supports our result on the negative impact
of individualism on average life-time in Theorem 4. For part b), it is clear that a higher rate of death, λd implies
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Figure 3. Illustration of part b) of Theorem 4.
that individuals with very high or low welfare levels are less likely to exist, thus leading to lesser inequality.
IV. CONCLUSION
We propose a mathematical model to study societal co-evolution under the forces of individualism and collec-
tivism. This work serves as an important step towards understanding the exact nature of the impact of individualism-
collectivism on various societal facets. Through our model we can show that the average welfare of individuals is
higher in an individualistic society, however the average life-time is typically lower in comparison to a collectivistic
society. A larger life-time in collectivistic society does allow for a larger population to be sustained, however the
cumulative welfare is still lesser. Moreover, the average inequality is more in an individualistic society owing to
the lack of social support. Our results show concordance with existing empirical tests.
V. APPENDIX
Theorem 1: Every society has a unique steady state.
Proof: We will start by deriving the population density at a given welfare level x, pλb,λd,r,w(x) and the total
population mass Pop(λd, λb, r, w) in the steady state and show that they are unique. To do so we first arrive at the
expression for the normalized population density fλb,λd,r,w(x). The relation between fλb,λd,r,w(x), pλb,λd,r,w(x)
and Pop(λd, λb, r, w) is given as, Pop(λd, λb, r, w) =
´∞
−∞ pλb,λd,r,w(x)dx, fλb,λd,r,w(x) =
pλb,λd,r,w(x)
Pop(λd,λb,r,w)
. In
steady state the average impact of the society, i.e. Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) is determined since the proportion of individuals
with Q = q, i.e. M(Q = q) do not change. Hence, the rate at which the welfare of an individual grows can take only
two values depending on his quality, R1 = (1−w).1+w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w), R−1 = (1−w).−1+w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w),
here R1 and R−1 are the rate of growth of good and bad quality individual respectively. To derive the densities in
steady state, we will first show that in the steady state R1 and R−1 will be positive and negative respectively. Let’s
assume that R1 and R−1 are both positive, i.e. all the individuals in the society experience a positive growth. In
such a case the individuals can only die due to a Poisson arrival. Also, we know that an individual who is born is
as likely to be good as he is to be bad. Hence, the population mass at which the rate of death will equal the rate of
birth of good/bad quality individual is the same for both the types of individuals, i.e. M(Q = +1) = M(Q = −1).
As a result, the average quality Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) = 0. Substituting this back in the expressions for the rate we get,
R1 = (1−w) and R−1 = (1−w).−1. Therefore, R−1 is negative this contradicts the supposition that the both the
rates are positive. Next, let’s assume that both R1 and R−1 are negative. In this case the individuals can die either
due to a Poisson arrival or due to hitting the death boundary. In such a case the welfare values attained will only
be negative. Let f1λb,λd,r,w(x) correspond to the joint density that the individual of good quality attains a welfare
level of x. Similarly, we can define f−1λb,λd,r,w(x) to be the joint density for a bad quality individual at a given
welfare level of x. In steady state although the density of population in a given welfare level is fixed, however
the individuals comprising the density at a given welfare level is not the same owing to change of welfare levels,
births and deaths that happen continually. As a result, at any instant of time the mass of individuals that attain a
given welfare level will equal the mass of indiduals that leave that welfare level either due to change in welfare
or due to dying. Consider an infinitesimal interval h, the mass of the population with quality Q = 1 between
x− h and x at time t, where x ≤ 0, is given as, f1λb,λd,r,w(x).h. Consider a time interval t
′
after which this mass
of individuals, f1λb,λd,r,w(x).h will either die or will attain a different welfare level between, y − h and y, here
y = x+R1.t
′
. The probability that an individual does not die a natural death in time interval t
′
is e−λdt
′
. Hence, the
proportion of the mass of individuals who do not die a natural death and a result attain a welfare between y−h and
y is e−λt
′
f1λb,λd,r,w(x).h = f
1
λb,λd,r,w
(y).h. This can be expressed as f1λb,λd,r,w(y) = e
−λd y−xR1 f1λb,λd,r,w(x) and
f1λb,λd,r,w(y) = C1.e
−λd yR1 where f1λb,λd,r,w(0) = C1. Similarly, for y ≤ 0 we can get f−1λb,λd,r,w(y) = C−1.e
λd
y
R−1
where f−1λb,λd,r,w(0) = C−1. Note that both f
1
λb,λd,r,w
(x) and f−1λb,λd,r,w(x) are zero for positive welfare values
since both good and bad quality individuals are assumed to have a negative rate of growth. Also, the rate at which
individuals of good quality and bad quality are born is the same given as λb2 . Hence, we can equate the mass of
good (bad) quality individuals which enter the society in time δt, i.e. λb2 δt to the mass of individuals between
welfare level of 0 and δx1 (0 and δx2), i.e. C1δx1 (C−1δx−1). This gives, C−1R−1 = C1R1 = C. Since the
f1λb,λd,r,w(x) and f
−1
λb,λd,r,w
(x) are joint density functions the integral of the sum of these joint densities should be
1.
´∞
−∞ f
1
λb,λd,r,w
(x)dx+
´∞
−∞ f
−1
λb,λd,r,w
(x)dx = 1
C1R1
λd
(1− e
λd
R1
r) + C−1R−1λd (1− e
λd
R−1 r) = 1
C = λd
2−e
λd
R1
r−e
λd
R−1 r
From this we can calculate the mass of the individuals with Q = 1 and Q = −1, i.e. M(Q = +1) = Cλd (1−e
λd
R1
r)
and M(Q = −1) = Cλd (1 − e
λd
R−1 r). Since R1 > R−1 we can see that M(Q = +1) > M(Q = −1). This yields
that the Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) > 0 and thereby R1 > 0. This contradicts the supposition that both the rates are negative.
Also, since R1 > R−1 the only case left is R1 is positive while R−1 is negative. In this case the good and
bad quality individuals take positive and negative welfare values respectively. We can calculate the joint densities
in the same manner as described above and thus the resulting density is f1λb,λd,r,w(x) = C1e
− λdR1 x, x > 0 and
f−1λb,λd,r,w(x) = C−1e
λd
R−1 x, x < 0, with C1R1 = C−1R−1. To solve for the constants we need to proceed in a
similar manner as above:
´
f1λb,λd,r,w(x)dx+
´
f−1λb,λd,r,w(x)dx = 1
C1R1
λd
+ C−1R−1λd (1− e
− λd
(1−w).1−wQ¯(λb,λd,r,w).
r
) = 1
C = λd
2−e−
λ
(1−w).1−wQ¯(λb,λd,r,w).
r
)
For simplification of notation, we introduce auxiliary notation, λ1 = λd(1−w)+w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w) and λ2 =
λd
(1−w)−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w) .
Hence, the density functions are denoted as follows, f1λb,λd,r,w(x) =
λ1
2−e−λ2r e
−λ1x, x > 0 and f−1λb,λd,r,w(x) =
λ2
2−e−λ2r e
λ2x, x < 0. Also, we can deduce that the marginal density fλb,λd,r,w(x) = f
1
λb,λd,r,w
(x), x > 0 and
fλb,λd,r,w(x) = f
−1
λb,λd,r,w
(x), x < 0. Using the density computed above we can calculate M(Q = 1) = 1
2−e−λ2r
and M(Q = −1) = 1−e−λ2r
2−e−λ2r . Also, the average quality needs to be consistent with the average quality computed
using the distributions derived above. This is formally stated as
Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) =
e
− λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
2− e−
λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
=
e−λ2r
2− eλ2r (1)
Next, we compute the total population mass by equating rate of births to the rate of deaths. The rate of deaths
is comprised of two terms, the first term is the rate of natural deaths occurring due to Poisson shocks and the
next term is the rate of deaths due to hitting the death boundary, fλb,λd,r,w(−r).(1 − w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))
corresponds to the density of the individuals hitting the death boundary per unit time. Hence, the rate of deaths
is λd.Pop(λb, λd, r, w) + fλb,λd,r,w(−r).(1−w−w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)).Pop(λb, λd, r, w), . Equating rate of births to
rate of deaths we get the following.
λb = (λd + fλb,λd,r,w(−r).(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))Pop(λb, λd, r, w)
λb = (λd + λd.
e−λ2r
2− e−λ2r ).Pop(λb, λd, r, w)
Pop(λb, λd, r, w) =
λb
λd(1 + Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))
(2)
Now that we have both the normalized density and the total population’s expressions, we can arrive at the
expression of the population density pλb,λd,r,w(x) which is just a product of the two, formally given as follows.
pλb,λd,r,w(x) =

Pop(λb, λd, r, w).
λ1
2−e−λ2r e
−λ1x, if x > 0
Pop(λb, λd, r, w).
λ2
2−e−λ2r e
λ2x, if x<0
If we can show that there is a unique average quality, Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) satisfying (1) then both the total population
mass (2) and the population density (3) are uniquely determined. We know that Q ∈ {−1, 1} hence, Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) ∈
[−1, 1]. To solve for Q¯(λb, λd, r, w), we need to solve z = g(z), where g(z) = e
− λdr
(1−w)−wz. r
2−e−
λdr
1−w−w.z r
and z ∈ [−1, 1]. We
will first show that there exists a solution in the set, [−1, 1]. Let z1 = −1 and z2 = min{1, 1−ww }. If w < 12 then,
z2 = 1 else z2 = 1−ww . g(z1) =
e
− λdr
1−w
2−e−
λdr
1−w
and g(z1) > z1. If w < 12 then g(z2) =
e
− λdr
1−2w
2−e−
λdr
1−2w
which is less than
or equal to z2 = 1, i.e. g(z2) ≤ z2. Based on this and since the function z and g(z) are continuous in the range
[−1, 1−ww ), there has to be a point in the interval [−1, 1] ⊂ [−1, 1−ww ) where g(z) = z. Also, g(z) is decreasing in
the range [−1, 1−ww ), this can be seen from the expression for g
′
(z) = − λdrw
(1−w−wz)2(2e
λdr
1−w−wz −1)2
2e
λdr
1−w−wz and z
is strictly increasing function. Therefore, g(z)− z is a strictly decreasing function in [−1, 1−ww ), which implies that
the root is unique. When w = 12 , z2 = 1 we can see that g(z1) > z1 holds, but g(z) is not continuous at z2. This is
not a problem as we know that the function is continuous everywhere from [−1, z2) and lim
′
z→z2 g(z) = 0, where
lim
′
z→z2 g(z) corresponds to the left hand limit, hence lim
′
z→z2 g(z) < z2. Hence, the same argument as above can
be applied. In the case when w > 12 then we will show that there exists a unique solution for g(z) = z in the range
[−1, 1]. We know that g(z1) = e
− λdr
1−w
2−e−
λdr
1−w
, but since w > 12 we need to be careful about the case when w = 1.
For now we can assume that 12 < w < 1. Hence, we know that g(z1) > z1. Here z2 =
1−w
w and g(z) will not be
continuous at z2. But we can show that lim
′
z→z2 g(z) = 0, where lim
′
z→z2 g(z) corresponds to the left hand limit,
and lim
′
z→z2 g(z) < z2. Hence, from the decreasing nature of g(z)− z we know that there is a unique solution in
the range [−1, 1−ww ). Since 1 > w > 12 then [−1, 1−ww ) ⊂ [−1, 1] we need to show that there is no solution in the
range ( 1−ww , 1]. In the range (
1−w
w , 1] the function g(z) is not necessarily continuous. There exists a discontinuity
if 2e
λdr
1−w−wz − 1 = 0 and z ∈ ( 1−ww , 1]. Let’s assume that there is a discontinuity. In that case, the function g(z)
will decrease values from −1 to −∞, then to the right of the discontinuity at 2e λdr1−w−wz − 1 = 0 the function
decreases from ∞ to 1
2e
λdr
1−2w−1
. Since w > 12 and 2e
λdr
1−w−wz − 1 = 0 for some z ∈ ( 1−ww , 1] 1 > 2e
λdr
1−2w − 1 > 0
we can say that 1
2e
λdr
1−2w−1
> 1. Hence, there is no point in the range in [−1, 1] which intersects with this function.
In the case, when there is no discontinuity it is straightforward to show that there is no solution of g(z) = z as
the function g(z) will only take negative values less than −1. Also, when w = 1 the individuals welfare is fixed to
zero all the time, hence there is a symmetry in the proportion of good and bad quality individuals, which leads to
a unique solution Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) = 0.
Lemma 1. Good and bad quality individuals attain positive and negative welfare values respectively.
Proof: The proof of theorem 1, already contains the proof for this lemma as we show that R1 and R−1 attain
positive and negative welfare values respectively.
Lemma 2. The average quality Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) and the average welfare X¯(λb, λd, r, w) of an individual a).
Decrease as the level of collectivism, w is increased., b). Decrease as the rate of natural deaths, λd increases., c).
Decrease as the the death boundary,−r decreases.
Proof: We already know that the solution for Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) requires solving a transcendental equation (1),
which means that we do not have a closed form analytical expression for it. It can be shown that the expression for
X¯(λb, λd, r, w) expressed in terms of the Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) is (r + 1λd ).Q¯(λb, λd, r, w). From Theorem 1, we know
that for every set of parameters there does exist a solution Q¯(λb, λd, r, w). For part a), as the level of collectivism is
increased let us assume that the average quality Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) increases. However, if there is an increase in both the
collectivism and the average quality, the expression g(Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)) = e
− λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
2−e−
λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
decreases which
contradicts the increase in Q¯(λb, λd, r, w). Hence, Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) has to decrease with an increase in collectivism.
And from the expression of X¯(λb, λd, r, w) expressed in terms of Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) it is straightforward that the
average welfare also decreases with an increase in the level of collectivism. For part b), again as the rate of
natural deaths increases assume that Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) increases. However the decrease in e
− λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
2−e−
λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
will contradict the assumption. With an increase in λd the first term in the expression of X¯(λb, λd, r, w) which
inversely related to λd has to decrease, this combined with the decrease in Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) leads to a decrease in
the average welfare. For part c), we arrive at the expression of the derivative of average quality Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)
w.r.t. r, − λd(d)(d+1)(1−w−wd)(1−w−wd)2+λdrw(d+1) which is negative. Hence, we know that the average quality indeed decreases with
an increase in r. For average welfare we give an intuitive explanation first, increasing r decreases the average
quality as a result of which the growth of a good quality individual slows down and the decay of a bad quality
individual becomes faster. As a result the average welfare levels attained by a good and bad quality individual are
lower. Moreover, increase in r increases the proportion of the bad quality individuals which further has a negative
effect on the average welfare. To prove this formally we will show that the average welfare of both good and
bad quality individuals decreases and the proportion of the bad quality individuals increases. Since the average
welfare value of a bad quality individual is always lower than that of a good quality individual this is sufficient
to show the result. The average welfare of good quality individuals is given as 1λ1 =
1−w+wQ¯(λb,λd,r,w)
λd
. This can
be derived as follows, the distribution of the welfare conditional on the fact that individuals are of good quality
fλb,λd,r,w(x|Q = +1) can be shown to be an exponential distribution with parameter λ1 exactly on the same lines
as we derived the joint densities f1λb,λd,r,w(x) in Theorem 1. Since Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) decreases as a function of r,
the average welfare of a good quality individual also decreases as a function of r. Similarly we need to arrive at
the distribution fλb,λd,r,w(x|Q = −1),which turns out to be fλb,λd,r,w(x|Q = −1) = λ21−e−λ2r eλ2x, x < 0. The
average welfare value of bad quality individual can be arrived at using this distribution and it turns out to be,
− 1λ2 + re
−λ2r
1−e−λ2r . As r is increased, Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) decreases and thus λ2 decreases as well. The partial derivative
of average welfare of bad quality individual − 1λ2 + re
−λ2r
1−e−λ2r w.r.t. r is given as
eλ2r−λ2reλ2r−1
(eλ2r−1)2 and this expression
turns out to be negative for (λ2, r) ∈ R2+. Also, it can be shown that the partial derivative of − 1λ2 + re
−λ2r
1−e−λ2r w.r.t
λ2 is given as ( 1λ2 )
2 − r2eλ2r
(eλ2r−1)2 and this expression turns out to be positive. Hence, from the sign of these partial
derivatives we can easily see the result.
Theorem 2. a) Total population Pop(λb, λd, r, w) increases as the rate of birth λb increases. b) Pop(λb, λd, r, w)
increases as the level of collectivism w increases. c) Pop(λb, λd, r, w) increases as the death boundary−r decreases.
d) If w < 12 then Pop(λb, λd, r, w) increases as the rate of natural deaths λd decreases.
Proof: In order to compute the total population in the steady state, we need to have the rate of birth equals the
rate of death which is formally stated as follows,
(λd + fλb,λd,r,w(−r).(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))).Pop(λb, λd, r, w) = λb
Pop(λb, λd, r, w) =
λb
λd.(1 + Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))
For part a), Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) does not depend on the rate of births and it is clear that the result holds since the
population is directly proportional to λb. For part b) as well it can be seen that the only term in the expression
which depends on w is Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) which will decrease as w is increased (Lemma 2). Therefore, it is clear
that the population has to increase with level of collectivism. For part c), again we can see that the only term in
the expression which depends on the death boundary −r is Q¯(λb, λd, r, w). We know that as the death boundary
decreases Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) decreases as well (Lemma 2), thereby leading to an increase in the population. In part d),
as the rate at which natural deaths occur decreases, the rate of deaths due to achieving poor welfare levels or hitting
the death boundary can increase. However, if the level of dependence on the society is low then the decrease in
the rate of natural deaths dominates, as a result the total population increases such that the mass of deaths equals
mass of birth. We now show this formally. Let us take the derivative of the term in the denominator w.r.t λd,
(1 + Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)) +
dQ¯(λb, λd, r, w)
dλd
(1+Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))(
(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))2 + λdrwQ¯(λb, λd, r, w)− λdrQ¯(λb, λd, r, w)(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))
(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))2 + λdrwQ¯(λb, λd, r, w)
(1+Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))(
(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)− λdrQ¯(λb, λd, r, w)) + λdrwQ¯(λb, λd, r, w)
(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w))2 + λdrwQ¯(λb, λd, r, w) )
If we can show that (1−w−w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)−λdrQ¯(λb, λd, r, w)) > 0 then the above expression will be positive.
We know from lemma 2 that Q¯(λb, λd, r, 0) ≥ Q¯(λb, λd, r, w), ∀w ∈ [0, 1] . This leads to Q¯(λb, λd, r, 0) < 1−ww+λdr
which is a sufficient for the above derivative to be positive. It can be checked that this condition is satisfied if
w < 12 .
Theorem 3: a) Cumulative welfare CF (λb, λd, r, w) decreases as the rate of birth λb decreases. b) CF (λb, λd, r, w)
decreases as the rate of natural deaths λd increases. c) If λdr ≤  < 12 &w < 12− with  > 0, then CF (λb, λd, r, w)
decreases as the death boundary −r decreases. d) CF (λb, λd, r, w) decreases as the level of collectivism w increases.
Proof: For part a), we know that CF (λb, λd, r, w) = X¯(λb, λd, r, w)Pop(λb, λd, r, w). Also, since the average
welfare of an individual is independent of λb we only need to consider the effect on total population which we
already know from Theorem 2. For part b), let us simplify the expression of cumulative welfare, CF (λb, λd, r, w) =
(r + 1λd ).
λb
λd
. Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
(1+Q¯(λb,λd,r,w))
. From this expression we can see that as λd increases the term (r + 1λd ).
λb
λd
will
definitely decrease. In fact the other term will also decrease, as can be seen from the derivative of the second
term w.r.t. λd , 1(1+Q¯(λb,λd,r,w))2
dQ¯(λb,λd,r,w)
dλd
and this combined with Lemma 2. For part d), we can see that
only Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
(1+Q¯(λb,λd,r,w))
depends on the weight w and its derivative w.r.t. w is 1
(1+Q¯(λb,λd,r,w))2
dQ¯(λb,λd,r,w)
dw . This
expression of the derivative and Lemma 2, lead us to the result. For part c), as the death boundary decreases, the
total population in the society increases whereas the average welfare of an individual decreases, leading to opposing
effects. Therefore, if the λdr is sufficiently low then the proportion of the population with bad quality is sufficiently
low as well. Also, if the level of collectivism, w is low then then the rate at which the welfare of bad quality
individuals decays with time is high, hence the effect of decreasing the death boundary on the average welfare is
high. Under these conditions the decrease in average welfare dominates the increase in population. We next show
this formally. The derivative of cumulative welfare w.r.t. r is given as,
( Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)
Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) + 1
)
.(
(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)2 − (λdr + 1)(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)))
(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)2 + λdrwd(d+ 1) )
( Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)
Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) + 1
)
.(
(w.(Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)).(−(1− w.(1 + Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)) + λdr + λdrQ¯(λb, λd, r, w))− λdr
(1− w − w.Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)2 + λdrwd(d+ 1) )
If −(1 − w.(1 + Q¯(λb, λd, r, w)) + λdr + λdrQ¯(λb, λd, r, w) < 0 then the above derivative is negative. Note
Q¯(λb, λd, r, 0) <
1−w−λdr
w+λdr
is sufficient for this condition to hold and it leads to the following condition, w < 12 − 
and λdr ≤  < 12 where  > 0. This proves part c.
Theorem 4. a) Average life time T¯ (λb, λd, r, w) decreases with an increase in rate of natural deaths λd. b) If
λdr > θ
∗ = ln(1 +
√
2
2 )
1, then T¯ (λb, λd, r, w) increases with an increase in level of collectivism w else, it first
decreases and then increases with an increase in level of collectivism w. c), If λdr > θ∗, then T¯ (λb, λd, r, w)
increases with a decrease in death boundary −r else, it first decreases and then increases with a decrease in death
boundary −r.
Proof: The expression for the average life-time of an individual T¯ (λb, λd, r, w) involves the computation of the
average life-time of good quality individuals and bad quality individuals separately and then combining the two
using the conditional probabilities. Hence, T¯ (λb, λd, r, w) = 1λd + (
1
λd
) Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)−Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
2
Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)+1
. The derivative of
T¯ (λb, λd, r, w) w.r.t w can be expressed as 1λd
Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
2+2Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)−1
¯(Q(λb,λd,r,w)+1)2
dQ¯(λb,λd,r,w)
dw . If Q¯(λb, λd, r, 0) <
√
2−1
then the above derivative is positive. This leads to the condition λdr > ln(1 +
√
2
2 ). However, if λdr < ln(1 +
√
2
2 )
then Q¯(λb, λd, r, 0) >
√
2−1 and as a result the derivative is negative. However, Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) will decrease with
increase in w and it can be observed that at w = 1, Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) will be zero, this is due to the fact that the
individuals completely depend on the society and the rate of growth is zero for all individuals. Hence, for some w =
w∗ the Q¯(λb, λd, r, w∗) =
√
2−1 where the life-time will take the minimum value. Therefore, we know that in the
region w > w∗, the life-time will increase. This explains part b). For part c), a similar explanation can be given. The
expression for the derivative changes to 1λd
Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
2+2Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)−1
¯(Q(λb,λd,r,w)+1)2
dQ¯(λb,λd,r,w)
dr and the rest of the explanation
follows from above and Lemma 2. For part a), we will first show that the average life-time of both a good and bad
quality individual decrease. Then, we will show that the proportion of the bad quality individuals increase. Since the
average life-time of a bad quality individual is always lesser than that of a good quality individual, this will lead to a
1θ∗ is a fixed constant which in general will depend on P (Q = 1), and when P (Q = 1) = 1
2
it is ln(1 +
√
2
2
).
decrease in the average life-time unconditional on the quality of the individual. First of all the average life-time of a
good quality individual is 1λd and it decreases with λd. Next, the average life-time of an individual with bad quality
is arrived at by computing the expectation of min{T ′ , T2(λb, λd, r, w) = r1−w(1+Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)) , } where T
′
is an
exponential random variable with mean 1λd . The life-time of a bad quality individual is
1
λd
.(1−e−
λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w) ),
the derivative of this expression is − 1
λ2d
.(1 − e−
λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w) − λdr
1−w−wQ¯(λb,λd,r,w)e
− λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w) ) +
r.w
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w)
dQ¯(λb,λd,r,w)
dλd
. The term (1−e−
λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w) − λdr
1−w−wQ¯(λb,λd,r,w)e
− λdr
1−w−w.Q¯(λb,λd,r,w) ) has
to be positive since (x+ 1)e−x < 1. Hence, we can see that the derivative is negative which implies the result.
Theorem 5. The average inequality V arX(λb, λd, r, w) is always more in an individualistic society w = 0
as compared to a collectivistic society w = 1. Also if the person only dies a natural death, i.e. r → ∞, then a)
limr→∞ V arX(λb, λd, r, w) decreases with an increase in level of collectivism w and b) limr→∞ V arX(λb, λd, r, w)
decreases with an increase in rate of natural deaths λd.
Proof: V arX(λb, λd, r, w = 1) = 0 since all the individuals have the same welfare value of zero. So, we need
to show that V arX(λb, λd, r, w = 0) > 0. The expression for variance is,
V arX(λb, λd, r, w = 0) = (
1
λd
)2
(8e2λdr + eλdr(−2(λdr)2 + 4λdr − 8)− 3λdr + (λdr)2 + 1)
(2eλdr − 1)2
It can be shown that the expression in the numerator of the above expression is indeed positive. To do so
we show that at any point (λd, r) ∈ R2+the partial derivative w.r.t to either λd or r is positive and also that
V arX(λb, λd = 0, r = 0, w = 0) > 0 which helps us establish the result.
For part a), the case when an individual only dies a natural death there is a symmetry in the proportion of
individuals with good and bad quality. Hence, the average quality of an individual is zero. Therefore, the rate of
decay for an individual with bad quality is 1 − w and the same is the rate of growth for an individual with good
quality. Hence, increasing w slows the rate of decay and growth, thereby allowing individuals to neither take too
low or too high welfare values, which leads to a lower average disparity. Formally if r →∞, Q¯(λb, λd, r, w) = 0,
this leads to the density distribution given as, f1λb,λd,r,w(x) =
λd
1−we
− λd1−wx and f−1λb,λd,r,w(x) =
λd
1−we
λd
1−wx. This
leads to the expression of the variance given as, ( 1−wλd )
2 and therefore, part a) and b) follow directly from this.
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